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ABSTRACT
In this paper we propose a theoretical approach to the study of technological
change that is based on the premise that people act on the basis of their
interpretations of the world, and in doing so they enact particular social realities
and endow them with meaning. Our interest in this approach is motivated by a
belief that existing studies of technological change have often overlooked the
underlying assumptions, meanings, and expectations that people have about
information technology. We believe that these interpretations of information
technology are critical to an understanding of technological use and change as
they significantly influence the way actors in the social world of computing
respond to it. Further, we posit that patterns of organizational change
occasioned by different types of technological interventions can be investigated
through changes in interpretations over time. This framework allows for the
diagnosis and understanding of intended and unintended changes around the
development and use of information technology in organizations.
* This is a much expanded and revised version of a paper that appeared in the Academy of
Management Best Papers Proceedings, 51st Annual Meeting, Miami Beach, FL: August
1991. The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the Center for Information Systems
Research at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the Ameritech Faculty Fellow
Program, and the Change Management Division of the Volpe National Transportation
Systems Center.
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With the increased deployment of information technology' in all aspects of organizational
life, organizational change around information technology is becoming increasingly commonplace.
A model of such organizational change that can provide insight and guidance to researchers and
practitioners is becoming increasingly necessary. In this paper we suggest that a useful way of
understanding and assessing organizational change around information technology is through
examining the shared cognitive models that people have about the information technology and its
role in their organization. This view is grounded in the interpretive notion that people act on the
basis of the meanings that things and events have for them (Blumer 1969; Strauss 1978), and that
understanding what and how such meanings are created, used, reinforced, and changed provides a
vehicle for explaining people's actions. People's cognitive models are particularly salient sense-
making devices during processes of organizational change (Bartunek and Moch, 1987; Isabella
1990; Starbuck 1989; Van Maanen and Schein 1979). Hence, by tracking changes in the meanings
people ascribe to information technology over time, we can investigate the processes and outcomes
of organizational change around information technology. Further, because this approach examines
change as experienced and interpreted by different organizational players, unintended as well as
intended changes around new technology can be studied.
Information technology has often been thought of as an organizational intervention,
designed to bring about desired changes (Bostrom and Heinen 1977; Kling and Scacchi, 1982;
Markus, 1983). Past research into organizational change around technology has focused on
changes in structure (Barley 1986, 1990; Carter, 1984; Kling and Iacono, 1984), information
processing and communication patterns (Daft and Lengel, 1986; Huber, 1990; Sproull and Kiesler,
1986; Zmud, Lind and Young, 1990), power relations (Markus, 1983; Newman and Rosenberg,
1985; Pettigrew, 1973; Robey, Farrow, and Franz, 1989), the nature of work and skills
(Buchanan and Boddy, 1983; Kraut, Koch and Dumais, 1988; Zuboff, 1988), and culture
(Hirschheim and Newman, 1991). While diverse in nature and rich in findings, we believe that
existing approaches of technological change have largely downplayed the underlying assumptions,
expectations, and meanings that people have about information technology.
In this paper we develop a framework of technological change that is grounded in the
shared meanings people have about information technology. By looking at patterns of these shared
meanings over time around a specific organizational issue--the development and use of information
technology--we are seeking a balance between context sensitivity and theoretical replicability.
Further, our framework allows for the examination of intended as well as unintended changes
around the development and use of information technology in organizations.
l By information technology we mean any form of computer-based information system (including mainframe as well
as microcomputer applications).
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In the following section we develop our concepts by drawing on research in social
cognition and organizational change. Next we discuss the framework of technological change that
integrates cognitive models and types of change, positing certain relationships and outcomes
around the processes of technological change. Finally we discuss the implications of this
framework for research and practice.
THEORETICAL GROUNDING
Based on research in social cognition and organizational change, our framework employs
two theoretical constructs, technological frames and types of technological change, respectively.
Technological Frames
A major premise of the research on social cognitions is that people act on the basis of their
interpretations of the world (Bartlett, 1932; Bartunek and Moch, 1987; Bougon, Weick, and
Binkhorst 1977; Goffman, 1974; Neisser, 1976; Porac and Thomas 1990; Schutz, 1970). For
individuals in organizations, these interpretations are organized and shaped by implicit guidelines
that constitute people's cognitive models or frames (Moch and Bartunek, 1990; Weick 1979b).
To the extent that information technology constitutes a core aspect of organizations, aspects
of members' cognitive models will concern information technology. In a recent paper (Orlikowski
and Gash, 1991) we defined this cognitive aspect as members' technologicalframes, and described
how these shape the way information technology is designed and used in organizations.
Technological frames are the set of assumptions, meanings, knowledge, and expectations that
people use to understand the nature and role of technology in organizations (Pinch and Bijker,
1987). For example, they may include understandings of what the organization's core business is,
and how information technology should be deployed therein. Because technologists are often the
most intimately involved in the building of technological artifacts it is frequently their assumptions,
meanings, knowledge, and expectations that most influence the design and construction of the
technology (Noble, 1986; Orlikowski, forthcoming).
The assumptions and meanings that constitute people's technological frames are often
shared by similar experiences, occupational training, socialization, group membership, functional
specialization, and organizational roles (Rousseau, 1978; Shibutani, 1962; Schein, 1985; Spybey,
1984; Strauss, 1978; Van Maanen and Schein, 1979). In particular, because individuals work in
what Brown and Duguid (1991) refer to as "communities of practice," technological frames reflect
the shared understanding of a technology by members of a social group. In the social world of
computing we can single out three distinct social groups which are implicated in technological use
or change within organizations--managers, technologists, and users (Kling and Gerson, 1978).
Managers or organizational decision makers control resources, set organizational objectives and
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strategy, and hence influence the direction of change. Technologists--either internal or external
systems developers--design, construct, install, and maintain the information technology to be used
in the organization. Users employ the information technology in their daily tasks to perform
production work for the organization. We posit that each of these three groups will have distinctive
technological frames representing that group's particular experience, interaction, and understanding
of the information technology. With respect to the development of information technologies there is
clear empirical support for the notion of multiple interpretations of underlying system features,
purposes, and design options (Bostrom and Heinen 1977; Lucas, 1974; Markus, 1983; Pettigrew,
1973). Diverse understandings of the nature and limits of technology, actors' intentions,
expectations, knowledge, and experiences, and the availability of organizational resources
(expertise, time, money, etc.) may easily create (at least temporarily) alternative conceptualizations
of the artifact to be designed.
In this paper we focus on commonalities of frames within each group and differences in
frames across groups. Past research has shown that different groups in organizations will perceive
interventions differently. For example, changes in human resource policies were perceived
differently by managers who created the policies and employees who were users of the policies
(Kossek, 1990). We recognize that the subset of assumptions, meanings, and knowledge that we
have labeled technological frames cannot easily be distinguished from the matrix of assumptions
and knowledge that individuals have about their work, social relations, career orientation, etc.
Nevertheless, we believe it is useful--analytically at least--to examine technological change by
investigating those assumptions, meanings, and knowledge that concern information technology.
Through an examination of the literature on organizational change and information
technology, we have identified seven sets of dimensions that may constitute the core dimensions of
technological frames across managers, technologists, and users (see figure 1 for a definition of
these dimensions and an initial set of components). These dimensions are an initial attempt to elicit
and articulate people's interpretations of information technology, and are not intended to be
exhaustive or complete. In particular, they are expected to vary by context and over time:
Philosophy towards technology is concerned with both individuals' own philosophy as well as
their perception of their organization's stance towards information technology. For example,
we expect people to hold fairly general, implicit assumptions about technology that it is helpful,
enabling, and empowering, or deskilling, disruptive, and controlling (Giuliano 1985; Noble,
1986; Winner 1986).
Issues around initiation concern the knowledge, expectations, and experiences that individuals
have about the initiation of a specific information technology, including background to and
motivation for the proposal, experiences with past information technology, nature and scope of
the proposed information technology (Ginzberg 1981; Perrow, 1983). For example, people's
experiences of mainframe computers in the seventies may have led to their expectations that
such computers are expensive, cumbersome, inflexible, and not "user friendly."
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Issues around implementation include knowledge, expectations, and experiences that
individuals have about the design, development, and installation of a specific information
technology, including background to and history of the implementation process, the timeframe
and stages of the implementation process, the amount, level, and quality of training, and
perceptions of implementation issues, barriers, and facilitators (Ginzberg 1981; Markus 1983;
Markus and Pfeffer, 1983; Robey, Farrow and Franz 1989).
Issues around use deal with knowledge, expectations, and experiences that individuals have
about the use of a specific information technology, including frequency and discretion of use,
level of customization, satisfaction, technical and maintenance support, and perceptions of the
information technology's cost, size, complexity, quality, and usefulness (Weick, 1990).
Criteria of success include the ways in which individuals evaluate a specific information
technology, that is, their assumptions about how the success of a specific information
technology is or should be assessed, and which criteria and measures are or should be utilized.
For example, we might expect managers to focus on return on investment or productivity as
measures of technological success, ignoring specific and local issues of task mediation.
Technologists, on the other hand, may concentrate on the technical capabilities of the
information technology, measuring success in terms of run-time, defect rate, or the complexity
and elegance of the program code. Contrary to both these views, users may care about how the
information technology helps them accomplish their work, emphasizing such dimensions as
usefulness, ease of use, and quality of information.
Impact deals with the expectations and experiences individuals have about the effect a specific
information technology has or will have on an organization's structure, culture, way of doing
business, workflow, nature of work, skills, control mechanisms, social relations, social status,
workload and stress (Markus 1983; Zuboff, 1988).
Relations with other players in the computing social world focuses on the relationships and
interactions that individuals have with actors in other social groups around information
technology. This dimension encompasses the three key groups already identified--managers,
users and technologists--and may also include third party players such as vendors, consultants,
customers, and government regulators.
We have suggested that groups will have different interpretations and hence frames about
information technology. We define the notion of congruence in technological frames as referring to
frames that are aligned on assumptions, meanings, expectations, and knowledge. By aligned, we
do not mean identical, but rather falling within a certain range on a continuum. That is, while there
will always likely be a difference in amount and detail of knowledge about information technology
across frames, we are interested in differences in kind not degree. Whether or not different groups
within a particular organization have incongruent technological frames at a point in time is an
empirical question. However, when technological change is initiated in organizations it is
reasonable to expect that technological frames will likely be modified. During this cognitive
change, frames may shift differently across groups, potentially resulting in frame incongruence.
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We adopt a process-oriented perspective to examine how frames are created, used, and
how they may shift over time by drawing on structuration theory (Giddens, 1984). In processes of
organizational structuring, organizational members draw on shared frames to accomplish their
action, and thereby reinforce (or change) the social and technological structures of an organization
(Barley, 1986; Giddens, 1984; Ranson, Hinings, and Greenwood, 1980; Macintosh and Scapens,
1990; Weick 1990). Likewise, organizational members draw on shared technological frames to
design or use information technology, thereby reinforcing (or changing) not only the structural
properties of the organization but also their own technological frames.
Our notion of technological frames attempts to capture both the historical and the
contextual nature of change. Under relatively stable organizational conditions, technological frames
will largely be taken for granted. By drawing on these technological frames to guide their action
around technology, individuals will reaffirm the validity of those frames and hence reinforce a
particular interpretation and use of information technology (Orlikowski, forthcoming). In less
stable organizational conditions where new and different technologies are introduced, established
technological frames will likely be challenged and potentially changed (Pettigrew, 1987).
When a change in technological frames is attempted, assumptions, meanings and
knowledge of information technology may change inconsistently, or not at all, due to institutional
inertia (Kling and Iacono, 1989), conflict (Robey, Farrow, and Franz, 1989) resistance (Markus,
1983), or misinterpretation by certain actors of the nature of change. Whether established frames
will persist, whether they will change incongruently, or whether new frames will in fact emerge
depends on the nature of the change intended, the criticality of the technology to the organization,
and the relative power of the various groups negotiating the change in meanings around the
technology. To more specifically articulate the process of change in frames and their likely
outcomes, we need a better understanding of different types of change.
Types of Technological Change
Organizational researchers have for some time been concerned with identifying and
discriminating among different types of organizational change (Armenakis, 1988; Golembiewski,
Billingsley, and Yeager, 1976; Meyerson and Martin, 1987; Miller and Friesen, 1984; Nadler,
1988; Watzlawick, Weakland, and Fisch, 1974). Pioneered by Lewin (1951), the study of broad-
based, paradigmatic change has emerged over time into the field of study sometimes referred to as
organizational transformation (Kilmann and Covin, 1988; Porras and Silvers, 1991). The different
perspectives in this area focus attention on different aspects of the change process, such as the
environment, structure, strategy, or culture. Because their perspective is based on shared frames,
we find the typology offered by Jean Bartunek and Michael Moch (Bartunek and Moch, 1987;
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Moch and Bartunek, 1990) to be particularly useful for our purposes.2 Bartunek and Moch (1987)
suggest that organizational interventions can be understood in terms of one of three types of
organizational change processes:
First order change reinforces existing frames and processes by incrementally modifying
current assumptions, meanings, knowledge, and processes. It is an organizational change that
occurs within an established mode of operating By presuming the utility of established frames, first
order change tacitly serves to reinforce present interpretations and the existing configuration of
interests and interest groups (Bartunek and Moch, 1987).
Second order change involves a shift to radically different frames and processes, with
the shift reflecting a replacement of the status quo. Much of the organizational transformation
literature has focused on this kind of discontinuous change (Kimberly and Quinn, 1984; Tushman
and Romanelli 1985; Levy, 1986; Hinings and Greenwood, 1988; Moch and Bartunek, 1990;
Porras and Silvers, 1991). Such radical shifts require extensive reorientation of people's frames to
facilitate the organization's shift "from one way of understanding significant aspects of itself to
another" (Moch and Bartunek, 1990:12). To accomplish this not only changes in frames, but also
evaluation criteria, formal roles, structures, and norms may be needed to reinforce the change. A
particular risk of radical change noted by Ackerman (1986:5) is that "Once a new state is
announced there is a risk that people will assume that when finally implemented, it will cure all ills
and the organization will not have to go through the change again. Unless the need to stay
adaptable is communicated clearly, people tend to fixate on achieving the "end" state and then lock
into it."
Third order change is less an actual organizational change as the creation of a capability
to change. The attempt is to avoid locking in to a paradigmatic state that may lose validity over
time. Such change builds a capacity for individuals to regularly reflect on their existing frames,
processes, and interactions, and to change them if needed. Morgan (1986:78) notes "Under
changing circumstances it is important that elements of organization be able to question the
appropriateness of what they are doing and to modify their action to take account of new
situations." Third order change does not imply that organizations must change continuously, but it
requires that individuals believe change to be an ongoing reality and hence that they need to be
regularly revisit their conceptual and material structures, and be open to alternative ones. Systems--
human, organizational, and technological--need mechanisms that allow awareness of and reflection
on the limits of assumptions, mechanisms that monitor and question taken-for-granted
assumptions, and capabilities that recognize when particular assumptions, meanings, knowledge,
expectations, and actions are appropriate and when they are not. Organizational change theorists
2 Interested readers are referred to Gersick (1991), Levy (1986), Meyerson and Martin (1987), Porras and Silvers
(1991), and Sheldon (1980) for reviews of other typologies of organizational change.
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have noted that future organizations must develop a self-diagnostic capacity to be aware of the
perspectives from which they are operating. That is, they should become "self-designing" or
"continuously improving" via frequent, critical examination of key assumptions, processes, and
structural decisions (Argyris and Schon, 1978; Hedberg, Nystrom and Starbuck 1976; Schein,
1989). For example, the so-called "learning organization" continually seeks to more appropriately
fit the present environment and to anticipate and create desired futures (Porras and Silvers, 1991;
Senge 1990). The total quality movement may also be seen as an attempt to increase the self-
diagnostic capacity of organizations.
We must emphasize that the three orders of change do not imply a sequence or a logical
progression of development, they merely outline the range of different changes that organizations
may undertake. Which type of technological change is more appropriate for a particular
organization is a function of environmental conditions, organizational and technological
characteristics, and the intentions of key players. While examining intentions around technological
change, we recognize that outcomes of technological development and use also reflect factors
beyond strategic choice (Noble, 1986; Orlikowski, forthcoming; Winner, 1986). In general, the
literature on the organizational impact of information technologies has considered unintended
changes as random error or interesting side notes to the main event. Recently, however, some
researchers have begun to focus specifically on the unanticipated, often subtle changes in
organizational structures and social relationships that follow technological implementations (Barley
1986; Gash, 1987; Kraut et al., 1988; Orlikowski 1989, 1991; Pettigrew, 1987; Zuboff, 1988).
Using the notion of frames and types of change, we suggest that one way of indexing or
understanding technological change is in terms of shifts in the technological frames of managers,
technologists, and users over time. Comparison of frames across groups over time reveals the
nature of change that particular groups have experienced as well as the areas and extent of
incongruence around new information technology. These analyses can identify sources of conflict
among groups involved in the change, barriers facilitators to technological change, as well as the
intended and unintended outcomes of the change process.
FRAMES, CHANGE, AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
This typology uses technological frames to identify three archetypal outcomes of
technological change: aligned intended, partial intended, and unintended changes. While numerous
other outcomes of technological change are possible, we believe that most such outcomes can be
expressed in terms of the three archetypal types (Greenwood and Hinings, 1988).
By aligned intended change we mean changes for which a dominant group, often
management, has an intended purpose and there is common understanding, agreement, and
commitment to that particular change direction and outcome across the groups of managers,
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technologists, and users. These include discrete, smaller, task-based changes that together
constitute a general direction of movement from one state to another. Put another way, aligned
intended change is agreement among groups about the direction and nature of a particular planned
change (encompassing possibly smaller changes), its implementation and outcomes. Typically in
the aligned intended change process, managers convey their intentions to technologists who
develop or modify the technological artifact according to these intentions which are clearly
communicated to and accepted by the users. All three groups modify their technological frames in
accordance with the change in the artifact and concomitant change in work practices.
In contrast, partial intended and unintended changes do not demonstrate the above-
mentioned quality of shared agreement and common vision. That is, the groups' frames are not
aligned, or only minimally. Partial intended and unintended changes differ on the dimension of
intentionality, or the degree to which an actor or group has consciously planned the change.
Partial intended change indicates that only some of the groups' technological frames have
shifted as a result of the technological change. A variety of scenarios is possible. The common
theme among them is that at least one group does not accept the intended change. Its members'
frames do not shift as expected during the intervention period, and they retain their pre-intervention
assumptions and understandings of information technology. We believe that a large part of the
difficulties around technological change are associated with difficulties in shifting technological
frames. Frames are "habits of the mind" and are often well entrenched and taken-for-granted.
Changing them requires overcoming inertia that tends to accrue in established and embedded
habits. Whether through the weight of old thinking habits, political or personal concerns, lack of
incentives, inadequate training, or simply insufficient exposure to the idea, members of a group do
not see or accept the idea of different ways of using information technology in the workplace. In
the sections below on each order of technological change, we describe scenarios that illustrate
some possible outcomes when various groups are "out of synch" with the others because they
remain fixed in their "pre-intervention" frames, while others have shifted their frames.
Unintended change occurs when one or more group does not resist change but experiences
the change differently from the other groups. That is, one or more group buys into a different
vision of the change than that intended. Where first or second order change is being attempted,
participants may perceive and experience unintended change that differs from intended change on a
range of organizational dimensions, such as workflow, decision-making authority, social relations,
nature of tasks, and so on. While we would expect managers to be less likely to experience
unintended changes, there may be significant differences between upper and lower level managers.
It is clear that a large number of permutations of the three archetypal outcomes are possible.
For example, consider the case where managers intend second order change, users only perceive
these as minor modifications to their current work, and technologists develop a radical information
10
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technology that is different from that intended by the managers (e.g., they embed more decision-
making authority in the interface thus passing power down to the users). This is partial intended
change (the users) along with some unintended change (the technologists). Clearly we could make
even finer distinctions within groups but we are limiting our discussion to more clear-cut cases for
exposition purposes. Once the concepts developed here (group frames, orders of change, notion of
congruence or alignment) have been found to have utility, then finer distinctions can be made in
later applications of the framework.
With technological frames of three key groups of actors as the starting point and a
structuring process over time, we can sketch the outlines of a process of technological change. We
make the assumption (a simplistic one--but necessary at this early stage of model development) that
at the starting point the technological frames of the three key groups are aligned--that is, congruent
at least in terms of the core dimensions. We represent this starting position in the column labeled
"Pre-Intervention Frames" of figure 2. We now trace the process of technological change in terms
of changes in technological frames for each of the three types of change discussed above.
First Order Technological Change
Implementors of intended first order technological change do not wish to radically alter the
way of understanding or doing business, but rather to improve established operations through, for
example, increasing productivity, efficiency, throughput, the handling of transactions, or
decreasing costs (Scott Morton and Rockart, 1984). Automation of existing tasks and processes
creates information systems that reflect and hence retain and reaffirm the organizational status quo.
This results in incremental changes in current practices and relationships that do not require
radically different assumptions, processes, or structures. Classic examples of first order
information technology changes are the early transaction processing systems built in the sixties,
such as payroll systems and large accounts receivable systems, whose primary goal was to
streamline high volume, highly routine paper processing work. First order change is not limited to
transaction processing systems, however. Initial versions of electronic spreadsheets were
developed simply to automate analysts' tedious manual calculations, not to transform their work.
Aligned Intended Change
In this change, the technological frames of all three groups have shifted to reflect a common
understanding of the incremental technological change usually through targeted communication and
training. The second column of figure 2a shows this parallel shift of all the groups' frames around
the new information technology. The groups use these altered technological frames to drive their
subsequent actions around the information technology, institutionalizing and reinforcing the
incremental changes in procedures, routines, and work practices.
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Partial Intended Change
When the technological frame of one or two of the three groups has not changed to
accommodate the incremental change in assumption, procedures, and information technology,
partial intended change results. The consequences of such a change are not expected to be highly
disruptive; an incremental change is by definition not a major departure from the status quo so that
a failure to accomplish it should not significantly jeopardize the organization. However, such a
change may result in inadequate development of technological capabilities by technologists or an
under-utilization of the information technology by managers and users.
Where users are the group that does not change, managers convey their intentions to
technologists who appropriately build or modify information technology (both groups altering their
technological frames in the process). The implementation of the new or changed information
technology is not accepted by the users who continue to operate under their old technological
frames and draw on existing practices to accomplish their work. The column 2 of figure 2b shows
that the users remain uncommitted to the change and are frozen in their pre-intervention frame. To
illustrate, Venkatraman's (1991) recent analysis of the Venkatraman and Zaheer (1990) study
reveals that insurance agents were using laptop computers inappropriately by trying to apply old
assumptions and norms to the new information technology. For example, agents would complete
spreadsheets manually and simply enter them into the electronic spreadsheets rather than using the
computational features for which spreadsheet programs are typically used. While managers may
attempt to force users to use new procedures, users may find ways to bypass these and stick with
what is familiar. This is particularly likely where the means of accomplishing work the old way
have not been dismantled, and users can easily draw on familiar routines rather than move to new
ones. Gasser (1986:217) for example, found that users "worked around" new computing
arrangements by reversing organizational procedures and employing backup, duplicate, or manual
systems. Markus (1983) also reports that the division accountants she studied surreptitiously
maintained a manual reporting system in parallel with the official computer-based one, fearing loss
of control if they should give up all their data to the computer (and hence to the centralized
corporate accountants).
Sometimes, however, a first order technological change is initiated by senior executives or
technologists (e.g., by upgrading existing software), and middle managers are the group reticent to
change. For example, headquarters may force a technological change on a division without buy-in
from local managers. Markus' (1983) study of corporate accountants imposing a centralized
system on divisional accountants is a case in point. Another scenario is when managers initially
intend first order change, even commissioning technologists to implement such modifications, but
they back away from these changes when they realize their implications, retreating to their pre-
intervention technological frames (see column 3 of figure 2b).
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A third way in which partial intended change may occur is when technologists do not
understand the intentions of managers to modify organizational processes through information
technology, or if they refuse to implement those changes because of backlogs or lack of computing
resources. While managers and users may change their technological frames, the technologists
remain rooted in their existing frames and the information technology does not deliver the intended
changes (see column 4 of figure 2b). Gasser (1986) in a study of MRP systems found that users
faced long delays in system enhancements because of lack of expertise in the information systems
department, restrictions on computing resource use, and unresponsiveness to requests for
improvements. For example, sales personnel reported "that they no longer requested new or
revised reports because they could not get a response from the DP department" (1986:214).
As we noted above, incongruent frames resulting from first order partial intended change
are unlikely to be so disruptive as to force resolution of the situation. The anticipated benefits of the
information technology improvements will not be fully realized and actors' expectations will likely
be disappointed. However, unless the first-order change in information technology is critical to
maintaining competitiveness, the incongruent state may continue.
Unintended Change
First order technological change sometimes creates outcomes that differ from
implementors' expectations. For example, as automation efforts spread throughout organizations,
and as hardware and software developments create opportunities for more complex and integrated
systems, some of the effects of the technological change experienced by users may be sufficiently
substantial as to go beyond the intended first order change. Even though managers may have
planned to merely create efficiency improvements, it is possible for unintended first order or
second order changes to occur.
In one scenario of unintended change, users may experience work changes due to the
information technology that is different from the changes intended by managers and technologists.
For example, Kraut et al. (1988) found that customer service operators, using a new system that
only allowed them to view one screen at a time, became less efficient as they were unable to handle
multiple transactions at the same time, for example, with the previous system they had closed out
one customer's transaction while dealing with a new customer's query. In this case, as shown in
column 2 of figure 2c, the technological frame of the users is different from that of the managers
and technologists.
Another example is where technologists implement changes to the information technology
that go beyond that intended by the managers or understood by the users. Technologists often wish
to create more sophisticated applications than managers had envisioned or are willing to pay for.
This is a classic case of a system with too many "bells and whistles" (see column 4 of figure 2c).
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Second Order Technological Change
In contrast to first order technological change where the information technology augments
and reinforces existing frames and processes, second order technological change deploys
information technology to replace existing frames and processes. The implementors of the
information technology do not intend to merely improve productivity or decrease costs, but to
change the way of doing business. The focus is on innovation, on for example, creating new
production processes, new structures, different products and services, defining new markets,
forging new relations with customers, suppliers, and entering into partnerships with related players
and even competitors. Huber (1984) and Scott Morton and Rockart (1984) note that multiple
discontinuous changes in information technology are triggered by various environmental
conditions, including increased complexity, turbulence and globalization. While implementors may
also intend to improve productivity or decrease costs, their primary aim is to change the established
assumptions and mode of operating. Second order changes--because of their scope and expense--
are frequently initiated when a crisis is perceived. That is, managers believe that the survival of the
organization is threatened unless the radical shift in information technology, operations, products,
markets, etc., is accomplished.
Examples of second order technological change are particularly evident in the information
system implementations of the eighties, when managers attempted to use information technology
strategically or for competitive advantage by radically redesigning old business processes
(McFarlan, 1984; Porter and Millar, 1985). These changes have often been associated with large-
scale organizational change, such as the initiatives labeled "business process redesign" (Davenport
and Short, 1990; Hammer, 1990) or "organizational transformation" (Kimberley and Quinn,
1984). For example, Walmart's just-in-time inventory system directly links check-out scanners
with warehouse computers and, through electronic data interchange, with suppliers' computers,
thus replacing previous systems that relied on personal selling and manual order-entry.
Aligned Intended Change
Where all three groups achieve a common understanding of the second order change in
information technology and work practices, we have aligned intended second order change (see
column 2 of figure 2a). To accomplish such second order change, managers must successfully
convey their vision of what the information technology is to do (their changed technological frame)
to technologists who need to understand these intentions well enough to be able to translate them
into appropriate systems. Managers must also ensure that users adequately understand and accept
the radical change and that there is a comparable change in users' technological frames. This
typically requires organizational interventions such as change management training and process
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workshops. In addition, because second order change implies substantial change in business
processes and modes of operating, managers need to institute changes in procedures, tasks,
incentive schemes, and reporting relationships to reflect the changed organizational vision.
Working within these changed organizational conditions, users will draw on their changed
technological frames to use the new information technology, and thereby enact a changed
organization.
Partial Intended Change
Second order technological changes are typically more difficult to accomplish than first
order changes because of the significant modifications in assumptions, meanings, and action
required. Problems of misinterpretation and inertia are even more likely here, and resistance to
change--either deliberate or inadvertent--may cause one or two groups to remain attached to their
pre-intervention technological frames. In contrast to partial intended first order change, the
consequences of partial intended second order changes are expected to be highly disruptive and
unstable because incongruence in frames will lead to serious ambiguity and conflict over goals and
outcomes.
One scenario for partial intended second order change is users' lack of commitment to the
second order change, either through lack of understanding, resistance to change, or initial
discomfort with the radically different information technology. Thus, users do not change their
technological frames to reflect the second order change, and attempt to use the new information
technology with an inadequate or incorrect understanding of it (see column 2 of figure 2b).
Because the organization reality they enact with their inadequate understanding will jar with that
expected by other groups, such partial changes are unstable, creating significant organizational
tension that will eventually have to be resolved. How, depends on the magnitude of incongruence
and the relative power of the groups. Two general resolution strategies are possible. First, the
managers may attempt to force the second order change on the users by either replacing the
recalcitrant users and bringing in individuals who accept the changes, or by massive retraining of
users and changes in incentive schemes. Second, the managers may have less authority or desire to
force their view on others. Here the autonomy of the users prevails and managers have to abandon
the attempted organizational change, thus aborting the second order change and returning to old
ways of doing things or slightly modified old ways of doing things.
Lack of real commitment by managers may also trigger partial intended second order
change (column 3 of figure 2b). While managers may commission technologists to implement
innovative information technology to create new ways of doing business, they may not fully
understand or buy into the implications of their intentions. Radical change is threatening for many
managers because it challenges and potentially undermines their established bases of power, status,
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authority, and influence. Thus, while they may publicly support the change effort, their compliance
may be only symbolic (Markus, 1983). Hence, managers' surface commitment does not reflect a
fundamental change in their assumptions, meanings, and knowledge of technology, and they will
not create the requisite changes in resource allocation, reward systems, and production processes
to do business differently with the new information technology.
For example, Zuboff's (1988) case studies found that managers were unable to accept
information technology that would increase workers' autonomy and decision-making authority.
The managers' technological frames were so rooted in traditional ideas of managerial authority that
they could not "wrest themselves from deep-seated images of managerial control" (1988:278). This
led to a serious incongruence between managers' and users' interpretation of the same technology.
Managers would not acknowledge that operators' jobs had changed significantly as a result of the
information technology, while the operators--experiencing the technological change--perceived a
fundamental shift in their meanings, tasks, and responsibilities. These frame clashes soon led to
social clashes around worker grievances and union action. Zuboff (1988:281) also recounts how
system developers contributed to the difficulties by creating what users perceived to be unfriendly
and complex interfaces which were difficult to manipulate.
At least three resolution strategies may be followed when managers are unable to accept the
intended second order change. The first assumes that the managers are dominant, and hence that
their view will prevail. The second order change is aborted, leaving the organization with a new,
sleek information technology that is used to support old ways of doing business--at best an
unintended first order change. The second resolution strategy would force the managers to buy into
the second order change, either through threat, extensive re-training, or by replacing them with
others more willing to accept the changes. Finally, the organization may continue to operate in an
unresolved state of tension for a while, but it will likely lose business and credibility, thus
threatening its own survival.
Sometimes technologists may inhibit intended second order change by not understanding
the intentions of managers to radically change the organization through information technology, or
by refusing to implement those changes because of inadequate skills and resources, or a fear of
losing influence. Here the managers and users share a common understanding of the change, while
the technologists retain their existing frame (column 4 of figure 2b), and create a technology that
does not support the expected changes. This scenario is less likely to occur than that described
below where technologists implement more substantial changes than expected. Where it does
occur, we expect managers to resolve the conflict either by forcing the change (perhaps using
external technologists) or by backing down and accepting what they perceive to be inadequate
technology. Depending on the criticality of the information technology to the survival of the
organization, this latter resolution may--in the long term--be self-defeating.
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Unintended Change
Even though second order technological change involves deliberate radical breaking with
past frames and processes, unintended changes may still occur. Greater unintended changes should
be expected under second order than under first order change, because of the difficulties and
discontinuities involved in shifting to new frames of reference and ways of organizing. While it
would appear that strategic systems enable organizations to plan and execute second order changes,
it is often the case that the second order changes that occur are quite unintended. Despite reports
that imply rational planning and decision-making, the reality is that many times systems such as
American Airlines' Sabre system create a dynamic that creates new opportunities through
serendipity rather than a priori strategic planning.
One scenario is where users experience a different kind of change to that intended, largely
because they encounter organizational or contextual situations not anticipated by technologists
(Perrow, 1983; Weick, 1986, 1990). For example, Perrow (1983) showed how the increasing
complexity of technological systems being built today may cause failure and breakdown because of
the technologists' inabilities to think through and test all the potential interactions that may occur in
operation. So too, with second order technological change, it is possible that the changed
technological frames and processes are poorly understood by users who have been inadequately
trained or who feel threatened by the transformation of their familiar structures, relations, culture,
and knowledge. Or the interdependencies in business processes may not have been understood, so
that the new way of doing things--thought to be self-contained--in fact disrupts other parts of the
organization, creating tensions, disjunctures, and inconsistencies. Users interacting with such
systems will develop frames that reflect the information technology as they experience it and not as
the implementors intended it (Weick, 1990). We depict such a possibility in column 2 of figure 2c,
where the users' experiences of the new information technology are seen to depart significantly
from those of the managers and technologists.
Another scenario of unintended second order change is the case of technologists
interpreting the desired changes very differently, and hence creating an artifact that represents a
different second order change than that intended by the managers (see column 4 of figure 2c). This
often happens when an organization buys an application package from an outside vendor to
perform a particular function, yet once the package is deployed various unintended and often
significant changes in business are required to accommodate the package specifications. Unable or
unwilling to modify the software package, managers and users are forced to change their
understanding and the organization around the information technology.
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Third Order Technological Change
Despite increasing attention to more organic organizational forms capable of dealing with
unexpected future environments (Huber, 1984; Malone, Yates and Benjamin, 1987; Drucker,
1988; Nolan, Pollack and Ware, 1989; Schein, 1989), we have yet to see information systems
embody the notion of third order change. We thus consider intended third order technological
change something of a special case at this time and we can only speculate on what the archetypal
outcomes might look like. At this point, however, we have no reason to expect that the three
outcome archetypes described above and depicted in figure 2 will not apply.
Third order technological change requires a qualitative shift in technological frames and the
use of information technology. The change requires the recognition of technological frames, and an
understanding of their influence--for example, on technologists in their creation and maintenance of
information technology and on users in their assimilation and use of the information technology in
their work lives (Dahlbom and Mathiassen, 1991). This recognition of the existence and role of
technological frames in shaping technological artifacts (in design and use) establishes the need for
mechanisms that monitor and question the assumptions. meanings, and knowledge underlying
technological frames. Thus, in the "learning" organization, groups need to be sensitive to the
appropriateness of their current frame and current technology to the organizational context and
environment. Mechanisms--human, organizational, and technological--to support this sensitivity
are critical. As the situation changes, and frames and technologies prove inappropriate to mediating
organizational work, built-in mechanisms would trigger changes in the frames and technologies.
This capability requires flexible technological and organizational designs rather than closed and
frozen systems.
Information technologies could provide some of these mechanisms. For example,
mechanisms may be built into the work procedures supporting the use of the information
technology or into the software of the system itself. Information systems, for example, may allow
the representation of technologists' and users' cognitive maps, it may record the assumptions
under which they were developed, and it may include procedures that notify users when the
underlying assumptions no longer hold or are being violated routinely. Most information systems
have helped significantly in fostering single-loop learning (Argyris and Schon, 1978), through the
controls, performance monitoring, exception reporting, and information memory that these
systems offer. Most do not have the capacity to support double-loop learning by questioning their
own premises. Information technology representing a third order change would provide a platform
for change, that would mediate current work as well as monitor usage and reliance on built-in
assumptions simultaneously.
Third order technological change requires that managers and users are capable of
distinguishing when their current technological frame and artifact no longer meet their needs, and
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are able to act to change the situation. Such a capability requires local autonomy and knowledge.
Users will need to know what portfolio of information technology-based options is available, how
to utilize those options and tools, and which options to pick for the different situations they
encounter. Where they are unable to do so because of inappropriate frames, inadequate resources,
or poor training, or where managers or technologists thwart them in their efforts to exercise this
authority, partial intended third order change will result. Factors that inhibit the move to third order
change include the inherent inertia of frames and the installed technological base, (i.e., the existing
application systems, methods, and technical architectures that need ongoing maintenance and
operation and are expensive and time-consuming to change).
DISCUSSION
In this paper we have outlined an approach to studying technological change that is
grounded in the underlying assumptions, meanings, and knowledge that people have about
information technology. We believe that these interpretations of information technology are critical
to an understanding of technological use and change as they significantly influence the way
managers, technologists and users in the social world of computing respond to it. We discussed
three archetypal outcomes of technological change that are occasioned by these groups' differential
understanding and acceptance of the technological intervention. We suggested that these patterns of
change and their likely outcomes can be investigated through examining changes in the three
groups' interpretations of information technology over time (see summary in figure 3).
In the sections above we have articulated the conceptual apparatus that can be used to drive
empirical work. Below we will explore some of the methodological and practical implications of
using this conceptual framework.
Implications for Research on Technological Change in Organizations
Our framework has a number of implications for research into technological change.
Recognizing the type of change intended, for example, has important implications for the
measurement of technological change. By not paying attention to the order of change intended,
researchers investigating technological change have assumed that measures of productivity or use
are valid throughout the change process; that is, the same measures have been used before and after
the technological intervention. Such measures, however, can only capture first order or alpha
change, that is, "changes in level of phenomena, while the type, dimensions, and criteria for
evaluating the phenomena remain constant" (Mohrman and Lawler, 1985:137). Such measures are
unable to capture intended second or third order changes, or any type of unintended change.
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Thus, assessing first order technological change with performance measures is relatively
straightforward only if the basic tasks and procedures have remained intact and there is no radical
change in frames. In this case, the performance criteria relevant before the change will still be
appropriate after the new or changed information technology is in use. For example, measures of
the number of insurance claims adjudicated per day, before and after the introduction of an
information technology to insurance agents, can be compared to determine the change in
performance afforded by the information technology.
However, where the information technology has also inadvertently triggered unintended
changes, assumptions and processes have been radically altered, and pre-defined measures that are
associated with performance criteria of the before condition cannot detect or assess this shift
(Golembiewski, Billingsley and Yeager, 1976). Unintended changes are typically more easily
recognized and understood through in-depth fieldwork which does not presume taken-for-granted
technological frames, and allows for the emergence of new assumptions, meanings, and
knowledge. For example, some researchers using process-oriented, qualitative methodologies have
reported unanticipated second order changes in organizations intending only first order change
(Gash, 1987; Markus, 1983; Orlikowski 1988; Zuboff, 1988; Barley 1990).
Intended second order changes, unlike intended first order changes, pose measurement
problems because frames and organizational processes are altered (Golembiewski, Billingsley, and
Yeager, 1976; Armenakis, 1988). Measurement of intended second order change is not
straightforward because the performance criteria may be qualitatively different--so that measures of
the before and after conditions cannot be compared because there has been paradigmatic change.
For example, where insurance claims processing has been automated, measuring workers'
productivity by number of claims adjudicated per day may no longer be appropriate, as other
features not measurable or pertinent in the before condition (such as quality of service and
customer satisfaction) may now be important components of the job. Further, unintended changes-
-such as managerial sabotage--are also more difficult to detect because they are by definition
unexpected. Qualitative fieldwork may be especially useful in detecting and assessing intended and
unintended second order changes.
We propose (building on Greenwood and Hinings (1988)) that it is possible to assess
technological frames across groups over time by tracking both perceptions of intended change and
experienced change throughout the technological change process. Given that frames are unlikely to
shift rapidly, periodic assessments of technological frames across groups will indicate movement
in the core dimensions. Focus groups, individual interviews, and specially designed workshops
provide useful data, such as shared images and specific language used. Clinical interviewing
(Schein, 1987) provides some guidelines for eliciting assumptions and meanings. Data gathered at
interactions between members of multiple groups (managers, users, technologists) may provide the
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best opportunity for observing congruence and diagnosing incongruences. The important
consideration is not which interaction is best suited for data gathering, but rather how to best
analyze the data. We posit that content analysis of qualitative data is a viable method for "reading
between the lines" of data to assess underlying assumptions, values and expectations, much as
culture researchers interpret manifest artifacts, symbols and stories. Such analysis would determine
what order of change is indicated within the currently held frames, and the extent of incongruence.
Interpretations of data by researchers may be validated directly with sources, and in fact such
validation may constitute a powerful intervention. By providing the parties with a relatively analytic
perspective, these interpretations may serve to foster discussion, reflection, and reorientation.
Empirical work is needed to track technological frames over time, as well as to assess the
value of the core dimensions posited for technological frames (see figure 1), and their use in
different situations and change efforts. We believe our approach is replicable across contexts
because technological frames and archetypal outcomes encompass more than situation-specific,
contextually unique elements. At the same time, the framework is more circumscribed than similar
cognitive approaches (Ciborra and Lanzara, 1990) that are inherently difficult to measure.
We believe that the shared or social aspect of cognitions is extremely powerful in
understanding the influence of information systems in organizations. To date, it would appear that
contributions of cognitive researchers have been essentially limited to understanding individual
cognitive processes such as learning, problem-solving, and knowledge representation in artificial
intelligence research, and issues around human factors such as visual and linguistic interfaces. Our
framework which focuses on the influence of shared frames suggests a potentially broader role for
social cognitive research in studying information systems. In particular, the manner in which
technologists' frames are embedded in the artifact they design and construct, and the influence of
other group's cognitions and organizational context on this process are important areas of study
(Dahlbom and Mathiassen, 1991; Perrow, 1983). Other areas might include identifying the means
through which frames around information technology become shared or divergent, and
determining areas of incongruence among managers, technologists, and users frames.
Implications for Managing Technological Change in Organizations
The framework presented has powerful implications for enhancing the process of managing
technological change in organizations. As Lucas (1974) and many others have noted, human issues
are typically the major source of failures in information systems implementation. Our framework
lends itself to both diagnostic and predictive uses in more timely identification of areas of conflict,
misinterpretation, collaboration, and synergy. Toward that end, it may be used as grounding for
diagnosis and feedback in an action research approach to information systems development and
implementation (Cummings and Huse, 1989).
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Our conceptualization of technological frames, with the dimensions posited earlier,
provides a means for monitoring groups' frames as the technology development and
implementation process proceeds. Initial assessment or benchmarking of frames will indicate the
degree to which participants share an understanding of the order of organizational change desired.
Readiness for technological change will be highlighted in particular by examining the frames of
technologists, managers, and users for acceptance, understanding, and expectation of a common
type of change. For example, the more all participants perceive that a particular type of change is
desirable and expected, the greater their readiness to change is likely to be, and the better the
likelihood of success. Obviously, the greater the congruence of perception across frame
dimensions, the greater the likelihood of success. Change agents may find that incongruence or
non-aligned understandings of the desired change outcome require a variety of interventions,
including reframing the change effort. Bartunek (1984), for example, observed that a school
principal was able to effectively bring about change via introduction of microcomputers by
assessing the situation and reframing the desired change as a more comfortable first order change
rather than a more uncertain second order change
Thus, preliminary assessment or diagnosis of frames should indicate areas of congruence
and incongruence, allowing change agents to identify the order of change people are expecting and
prepared for, and their implicit and explicit measures of success. This should lead to more effective
management of the communication, direction and timing of technological change efforts.
Implications for Developing Information Technology in Organizations
The framework developed here also has implications for the practice of information
systems development. Technologists have tended to rely on structured methodologies to elicit
information requirements from managers and users and design and construct information systems.
Traditionally these methodologies have paid inadequate attention to technologists' assumptions,
meanings, knowledge, and expectations, and how these aspects of frames might differ
significantly from the frames of managers and users for whom the technology is being built. Some
of the techniques of frame assessment mentioned above might usefully be applied to technologists
to track the degree to which they are aligned with their clients. These techniques would be
particularly important in the case of external systems consultants as they have no common
organizational context with their clients, hence communication is more difficult. In addition,
technologists would benefit greatly from understanding systems development as a change process,
as well as appreciating the order of change intended by their clients. A general understanding of
3 See Orlikowski and Gash (1991) for further discussion of interventions such as the consulting mode used by
technologists, the need for role clarification, consensus building, and information sharing.
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change processes increases sensitivity to client reactions (such as resistance), while appreciation of
the type of change intended allows technologists to better match their expectations with those of
their clients. This would more likely result in a closer alignment between the technology that is
actually built and the technology that was intended.
Calls for "learning" or "self-designing" organizations heighten the need for third order
information systems. There clearly are situations for which third-order technological change may
be appropriate, yet the technologies being developed today appear to reflect first or second order
changes. For those organizations attempting a third order change, the definition of what a third
order technology may look like is critical. Adopting first or second order technologies in such a
situation would be problematic, because by their nature, such technologies make the recognition of
and move towards third order change difficult. That is, first order change assumes that the existing
frame is fundamentally valid, while second order change assumes that the old frame is no longer
valid but that the new one is. Neither recognize that frames may need to be assessed regularly for
validity. Further, first and second order changes make it difficult for organizational members to
remain open to future change. That is, first and second order change encourage the transparent
mediation of work, where users take for granted the assumptions underlying their interaction with
the information technology. Perhaps it will turn out that newer technologies, including object-
oriented development (Chorafas, 1989), may allow for greater paradigmatic permeability and frame
flexibility. Instead of creating multiple specialized and stand-alone information technology,
technologists building for third order change may need to construct flexible, technological
platforms that embody multiple alternative modules and options from which technological
capabilities for particular conditions can be quickly constructed, assembled, and used.
We have argued that one can examine patterns of organizational change occasioned by
different types of technological interventions in terms of changes in technological frames over time.
One of the major contributions of this paper is the integration of technological frames and orders of
organizational change. There is increasing recognition of the importance of social cognitions with
respect to the development and use of information technology in organizations. To date, however,
there has been a lack of concepts or models for thinking more specifically about the process of
technological change, with an eye for both theoretical rigor and practical use. We believe that our
framework allows researchers to explore the nexus between technical and organizational change
processes through the vehicle of technological frames and archetypal change outcomes. We have
proposed a framework and methodology for assessing the process and outcomes of technological
change in organizations, which allows us to distinguish between intended, unaligned, and
unintended technological changes, and to investigate how and under what conditions they occur.
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